On Aqueous Property Rights and Managing Fisheries

Today our Orientation to Law professor discussed fisheries management and its relation to the law. In a criticism of purely ideological or unidimensional perspectives of the law, he argued against private property rights over fish stocks, implying that he supported a moderate approach to maritime resource management.

His argument was buttressed, and ultimately undermined, by his example of the problem of private fishery management. The professor noted that (this is a paraphrase) "if a large, profitable corporation, with a diverse portfolio of industries, owns a fishing stock which comprises a small portion of the corporation's holdings, than it can afford to exploit the resource to the point where it cannot be replenished because they can simply profit from other ventures."

This assertion makes no sense, however. If a private groups were able to exercise true or even quasi property rights (through quotas allocated by auction or other market mechanism) over a particular fishery, there would invariably be an economic incentive to maintain the value of the holding, especially if it was interested in divesting the holding. If the group was not interested in divesting the holding (ie. if it intended the maintain ownership over the holding) would it not make sense to ensure the continued viability and profitability of the fishery over which it has jurisdiction?

More property rights on the sea--instead of the bureaucratic intervention that our professor by default accepts--is the answer to the sustainability of renewable maritime resources.