On Karla Homolka, the Criminal Code, and the Restriction of Liberty

With the Quebec Superior Court ruling that the she does pose a risk of re-offending, it appears that, after all, Karla Homolka will have restrictions placed upon her once she completes her penitentiary sentence for rape and murder this summer.

The restrictions, authorised by s. 810 of the Criminal Code, provide for, among other things, a requirement to notify police of her travel arrangements, a prohibition on coming into contact with teenagers and individuals with a criminal record, and a ban on taking employment where certain medications and drugs are dispensed.

Though I've never really considered post-sentencing restrictions before, I have serious reservations about sanctioning them. Restricting one's liberty after the completion of one's sentence repudiates central tenets of the rule of law and fundamental justice, such as having prior, clear knowledge of the punishment for an offence, and that the punishment not be vague, overbroad, or indeterminable.

One might respond that offenders frequently have restrictions placed on their movements and whom they may contact. However, often this is effected while an offender is on probation or on parole, id est as part of the sentence originally meted out upon conviction.

Given that Canadian courts often throw out convictions or acquit individuals for *minor* violations of their liberty interests (cf. R. v. Mann--accused acquitted of trafficking pot on appeal, as a protective pat-down search undertaken by an officer was not 'minimally intrusive', but otherwise constitutional), it's amazing how the same state can duplicitously support such onerous conditions *for someone has fully completed a sentence*. This smacks more of satiating a bloodthirsty public rather than the advancement of justice.

S. 810 of the Code permits the state to restrict one's liberty just prior to having completed one's debt to society, when there are reasonable grounds "to fear that the [offender] will commit a serious personal injury offence". Since this can be determined partly based on her criminal past, the question here is not whether Holmolka should or shouldn't have restrictions placed upon her liberty, but whether she should have her liberty at all. My preference would be to see s. 810 fall into disuse for violent offenders like Homolka, whose crimes justify a permanent restriction on their liberty--through *sentencing* them to a lifetime of imprisonment, instead deciding *after the fact* that twelve months of state-imposed lifestyle conditions are necessary for the public's protection.