Getting a Grip on S. 810
For some reason, Bellator accuses me of being "soft on crime" despite my calls for tougher sentencing (ie. real life imprisonment) for criminals of the ilk of Karla Homolka.
Central to his argument defending section 810 is that it enshrines part of "the state's most sacrosanct duty of protecting its citizens from harm".
The problem here is that the restrictions meted out to Holmolka hardly effect the end of protecting the public. Requiring her to report to police before she travels? Showing up at a police station once a week for 30 seconds to say hi? No consumption of already illegal drugs? These restrictions don't prevent recidivism, especially given that for 6.99 days of the week Homolka is not supervised by the justice system. While one might argue that the measures which she must obey *don't go far enough*, the fact that the measures statutorily expire after 12 months is proof that 810 does nothing for its purported goals. The criminality of supposedly dangerous offenders doesn't expire after a one-year warranty.
In fact, the *only* way to achieve these goals is a full term of imprisonment, and perhaps greater statutory restrictions of plea bargaining of the nature we saw in this case. While some want to spill ink and waste time defending a Criminal Code provision which at best doesn't even effect the salutary ends promoted by its defenders, my preference is to to advocate real measures to protect the public rather than commenting on the Code's pretty window dressing.
Real reform of Canada's justice system cannot occur in the face of such acquiescence to status quo half-measures just because it's better than nothing.
1 Comments:
And my argument was that the tools you advocate be used in this situation don't really address the issue of public safety (their stated purpose in your characterisation), yet come at the expense of denigrating principles of fundamental justice.
You are accurate to imply that, abstractly, these restrictions are objectionable but they hardly fall into the realm of misapplication. In practice the restrictions don't effect the end for which they were meant, while giving the public a false sense of security about her release and potentially stifling future reform because the tools used in this case were seen to be effective, insofar as they were used.
So the question: if the preventive aspects of the s. 810 restrictions are tenuous at best, what do you argue is the underlying rationale of their imposition?
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